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SOCIAL PROBLEMS, Vol. 30, No. I, October 1982

THE ORIGINS OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY
AND HEALTH ACT OF 1970·
PATRICK G. DONNELLY
University of Dayton
This paper analyzes the emergence of the Occupa tional Safety and Health Act of
1970 and finds previous explanations of its origin inadequate . I trace the roots of this
law to the protests of rank ·and·file workers across Ih e United States a t a time when
the s upport of the se workers was particularly important to the two main political par·
ties. The protes t was directed not only at those employers who ope rated unsafe and
unhealthy workplaces , but a lso al union off ic ia ls who paid litt le or no attention to
safety and health iss ues in negotiating new contracts.

In 1980, 13,000 workers were killed and 2.2 mi ll ion workers suffered disabling injuri es in
workplace acc id ents in the United States (National Safety Co uncil, 1981 :25). Government
estimates indicate tha t occ upational diseases and illnesses kill ano ther 100,000 workers a nd a rnict
390,000 workers each year (U .S. Department of Health, Educatio n, a nd Welfare, 1972). Both
sets of figures are conservative est imates since they rely only on cases reported by employers , who
have an economic incentive not to report accidents a nd illnesses. Fu rthermore , the med ical a nd
scientific communit y does not know whether many commonly-used chem icals a nd o ther
substa nces a re d angerous , si nce the onset of the disease o r illness may occur up to 30 years a fter a
worker was exposed to the substance. T he Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHAct)
was designed to protect over 55 million workers in 4.1 million workplaces. It is the first co mprehensive federal legislation in the United States to recogn ize the right of the government to in spect, cite, and penalize employers for infringements of th e right of workers to labo r under safe
a nd healthy conditions.
T he OSHAct can be traced back to 1968 when legislat ion o n worke r safety and health was in troduced in Congress . T he legislat ive debate shows that the business communi ty was vehement ly
opposed to the strong bill proposed by the Democrats (Bureau o f National Affairs, 1971; Page
a nd O'Brien, 1973). When the Republican admi ni stration of President Nixon introduced its bi ll in
1969, it differed significantly from the Democrat's bi ll : it gave less power to th e Labor Depart ment, relied more on state governments, and put th e final enforcement responsibilities in the
hands of a presidentially-appointed comm ission. Business representatives had suggested all of
these cha nges earlier, argu in g that a worker safety and health bill sho uld not centralize power in
anyone department or level o f governmen t . While this analysis o f Congressio na l debate is impo rtant for a n understanding of the law-creati on process, it does not co nsider the socia l, pol iti cal,
and econo mic factors th at led to th e bill's introd uction in Congress . In this paper, I first assess
previous explanations of th e origins of th e OSHAct a nd then examine two factors which have
been consiste ntly overlooked; rank-and -file act ivism and th e political climate of the I 96Os.
FOUR PREVIOUS EXPLANATIONS

The Objeclive Condilion
Some au thors suggest that the key facto r in the birth of the OSHAct was the number of

• An earlier version of thi s paper was presented a t the a nnua l meetin g o f the Society for the Stud y o f Social
Problems, New York, 1980. The author thanks Bill Chambliss, Gerry T urkel, Dave Erm a nn, Brenda Wixson
Donnelly, Steve McNamee, Dan Mill er, Ron Kramer a nd the Social Problems rev iewers for their comments .
Correspondence to: Department of Sociotogy, University of Dayton, Dayton, O hio 45469.

57

14

DONNELLY

workers killed and injured in the United States or the increase in these figures during the 1960s
(Altman, 1976; Bureau of National Affairs, 1971; Gersuny, 1981). The number of workers injured rose from 1,950,000 in 1960 to 2,200,000 in 1967 . Deaths from workplace accidents increased from 13,800 to 14,200 during the same period (National Safety Council, 1981 :25). Much
research was published during this period revealing previously unknown health hazards or demonstrating a greater seriousness of already recognized hazards. Ashford (1976) argues that legislation was the federal government's natural response to a growing social problem. However, such
explanations fail to explain why the government remained inactive for decades when the number
of workers killed and injured by acc idents was as high or higher than it was in 1967 . During the
I 920s, for example, an estimated 20,000 workers were killed each year and another 2.6 million
were disabled (Woodbury, 1927). In 1945, 16,500 workers were killed and 2 million were injured
(National Safety Council, 1981 :25). Furthermore, while the number of workers killed and injured
increased between 1960 and 1967, the ratio of injury and death to the total work force decreased.
In 1960, there were 3,028 injured per 100,000 workers; by 1967 the ratio had fallen to 2,945.
Deaths from workplace accidents decreased from 21 per 100,000 workers in 1960 to 19 in 1967
(National Safety Council, 1981:25). While these statistics cannot minimize the seriousness of the
problem in 1967, they do show th at workplace safety was not deteriorating as others have
implied.

Public Opinion and Mass Media
However serious a condition may be, little will be done to solve it unless a segment of the public
considers it worthy of concern (Blumer, 1971; Piven and Cloward, 1971; Ross and Staines, 1972).
Ashford (1976) suggests that the public attention given to wcrkplace disasters in the 1960s was a
major factor leading to legislation. This implies that the OSHAct was a response to an increasingly aware pUblic. However, neither public opinion polls nor media coverage suggests that unsafe
and unhealthy working conditions were perceived as a major social problem by the public during
the 196Os. The Gallup polls found people most concerned about the Vietnam War, crime, racerelated issues including the urban riots, the high cost of living, and poverty. In fact, at no time
during the 1960s were workplace conditions mentioned frequently enough to warrant reporting
by the Gallup poll (Gallup, 1972).
Media coverage of worker safety and health issues was sparse prior to the introduction of
legislation . I examined the New York Times Index and the Readers' Guide to Periodical
Literature to evaluate media coverage.' The key year in assessing whether the media directed
government attention to worker safety and health is 1967. Although the first worker safety and
health bill was not introduced in Congress until 1968, Labor Department lawyers drafted the
legislation in 1967. Only seven articles dealing with the issue appeared in the New York Times
during 1967, and only six articles appeared in any of the 128 U.S. magazines indexed in the

I. The use of such indexes to indicate the importance of social issues is widespread (Becker, 1963; Dickson,
1968; Funkhouser, 1973; Galliher and Walker, 1977; Schoenfeld et al., 1979). I counted the number of articles in the New York Times Index and the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature under the subject
headings related to worker safety and health. In the New York Times Index, the categories were: Accidents,
Industrial; Accidents , Mining; Occupational Health ; and Labor - U.S. - Occupational Hazards and Safety.
The main subject headings in the Readers' Guide were: Industria l Safety; Diseases, Indu stri al; Industrial
Hygiene; Coal Mine and Mining- Accidents and Explosions; and Accidents, Industri al. In both indexes,
when cross-references referred to another category, I counted on ly those art icles wh ich clearly related to
worker safety and health hazards. The Monthly Labor Review, published by the U.S. Department of Labor,
is indexed in the Readers' Guide but I did not count articles appearing in it because of the purpose of my
analysis-to determine whether the social issue created government interest or vice versa.
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Readers' Guide. In 1966, there were 12 articles in the New York Times and only one in the indexed magazines. Furthermore, the magazines that published articles on worker safety and health
in 1966 and 1967 were Science News, Business Week, the u.N. Monthly Chronicle, and
Science-all special-interest publications.
The few newspaper and magazine articles appearing in 1966 and 1967 might have had an impact if they had represented a drastic increase in media coverage of the problem. Yet, as Table 1
shows, there is little discernible pattern to media coverage of the problem in either the New York
Times or the indexed magazines. The seven articles in the New York Times in 1967 represent the
second lowest number of articles from 1950 to 1967. The six 1967 magazine articles represent a
significant increase over the one article in 1966, but are still fewer than the number of articles in
II of the preceding 17 years.
It is unlikely, then, that media coverage played a major role in the creation of a law to deal with
the problem of worker safety and health. Table I shows a sharp increase in the number of articles
dealing with the problem only after government officials drafted legislation. Thus, government
action played a major role in the creation of a social issue.
An examination of the data on the attention paid to several major industrial disasters during
the 1960s reveals a similar pattern. In 1963, two accidents in mines, one in Utah that killed 18 and
another in Pennsylvania in which two trapped miners were dramatically rescued, triggered seven

TABLE 1

Media Coverage of Issues Related to Worker Safety and Health, 1950-1975
Number of Articles In
Readers' Guide to
Periodical Literature

Year

New York Times Index

1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1956
1959

53
73
38
16
16
29
24
35
7

11
11
17
7
4
4
21
6
7
6

1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1966
1969

21
9
14
39
6
10
12
7
53
111

6
15
3
6
7
2
1
6
17
26

1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975

104
99
61
56
65
74

16
25
16
18
26
21

44
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magazine articles within six weeks of the events. In the two years that followed these accidents,
there were 12 magazine articles indexed under the category "Coal Mines and Mining: Accidents
and Disasters." However, many industrial disasters in the past received considerable attention
without leading to any large-scale attempt to eliminate the problem. On December 6, 1907, a
mine explosion in West Virginia killed 361 workers. Only 13 days later, 239 workers were killed in
a mine explosion in Pennsylvania. Within two years of these disasters there were 35 magazine articles indexed under the heading "Coal Mines and Mining: Accidents and Explosions." Yet no
major legislative action was taken.

Environmental Interests
Some au thors suggcst that the environmental movement of the 1960s played a major role in the
recognit ion of the need for worker safety and health legislation (Ashford, 1976; Berman, 1978;
Bureau of National Affairs, 1971; Gersuny, 1981). It is plausible that the recognition of generally
deteriorating environmental conditions would lead to concern over the well-being of workers, the
persons closest to industrial air pollution. Yet there is little evidence to support this argument.
Rarely have the environmental movement and the worker safety and health interests overlapped.
One federal government study of occupational health, conducted in 1965, was done for the
Public Health Service by the National Advisory Environmental Health Committee (NAEHq.
The study was undertaken after committee members realized that most research examined pollution in the general environment rather than the work environment (Ashford, 1976). Another link
between the environmental and worker safety and health issues is the launching by the American
Medical Association (AMA), in 1960, of a journal entitled The Archives oj Environmental
Health: Preventive, Occupational, and Aerospace Medicine. However, the journal was a continuation of a previous AMA journal, The Archives oj Industrial Health. The AMA's interest in
indust rial health preceded its interest in environmental health.
There is some evidence that the environmental movement did not generate interest in the
worker safety and health issue. Media interest in worker safety and health and in environmental
concerns both accelerated in 1969, while the OSHAct was already being debated in Congress
(Sch oenfeld et 01:, 1979:48). Many of the links between the issues came after 1970. Ralph Nader's
Health Research Group and Dr. Irving SelikofPs Society for Occupational and Env ironmental
Health were both formed afterwards. Local groups such as PhilaPOSH, the Philadelphia Project
on Occupational Safety and Health, began working with environmental groups on projects of
mutual interest in the late 1970s.
The environmen talists were often at odds with workers prior to the OSHAct because of the differen t concerns of the two groups (Gunningham, 1974; Stellman and Daum, 1973). The environmentalists often pressed for the elimination of pollution even when it would mean a loss of
jobs. There is little evidence that environmental interests played an active role in generating concern about the safety of the workplace.

Labor Union Interest
During the 1960s, a period of relative prosperity, unions did not have to struggle for higher
wages, fringe benefits, and pensions, si nce industry was willing to share the fruits. But there is no
evidence to support the claim that this freed unions to struggle for safer working conditions, as
the Bureau of National Affairs (1971) argues. Unions traditionally have given little attention to
safety and health (Cummins, 1932), and the 1960s were no exception. One indicator of organized
labor's willingness to press for improved safety and health conditio ns is the extent of work stoppages over the issue. Yet, relatively few work stoppages occur over safety and health issues. Since
1961, the classification system used by the Bureau of Labor Statistics on the cause of strikes in-
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eludes a category labeled "Safety Measures, Dangerous Equipment, Etc." At no time during the
1960s were more than 1.6 percent of all strikes in the United States over safety hazards (U .S.
Department of Labor, 1961-70).
In May, 1966, President Johnson challenged unions to transcend the "bread and butter issues
in order to join with us in the effort to improve the total environment" (Public Papers of the
Presidents, 1966:237). He referred to new health hazards created by industry since the Second
World War.
Neither George Meany, president of the AFL-CI0, nor Walter Reuther, head of the UA W, displayed any
real interest in the issue, and their lack of enthusiasm undercut any desire on the part of the White House
to press forward with a new program (Page and O'Brien, 1973:138).
It might be argued that organized labor settles safety and hea lth problems through collective
bargaining. Yet, a number of government surveys of collective bargaining agreements during the
1950s and 1960s demonstrate that this is not the case. A national survey of 1,594 agreements in effect in 1954-55 shows that only 356 (22 percent) contained clauses providing for comm ittees concerned with plant safety, sanitation, and employee health. Among these agreements were 75
which did not specify that emp loyers and unions were to participate jointly on the committees
(U.S. Department of Labor, 1956). Bureau of Labor Statistics data on collective bargaining
agreements a decade later, in 1963-64, again demonstrate the lack of concern on the part of
organized labor. Only 21 of 450 major agreements (5 percent) sampled con tained any provision
for union-management cooperation in safety and health issues. Two clauses that the U.S. Department of Labor (1966:44) described as typical were: (a) The union agrees with the objective of
achieving the highest level of employee performance and efficiency with safety, good health, and
sustained effort; and (b) Cons istent with the principle of a fair day's work for a fair day's pay and
consistent with the employees' welfare in regard to safety, health, and sustained effort, the union
agrees to cooperate with management in its efforts to increase employee effectiveness and productivity. Such clauses do not demonstrate organized labor's deep concern for safety and health
since they balance workers' health and safety against productivity and profit.
The platforms of the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations
(AFL-CIO) that were presented to the Democratic and Republican national conventions in 1964
and 1968 also show the low priority given to safety and health conditions. In 1964, the AFL-CiO
platform was 24 pages long and covered the foHowing topics in order of discussion: economic
issues and jobs, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, foreign policy and defense, social and public needs,
labor and management (relations), social security and health, and government administration.
The only mention of worker safety and health came on page 22, when 11 sentences were devoted
to asking the federal government to help make state safe ty codes uniform (American Federation
of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations, 1964). In 1968, the AFL-CIO platform expanded to 34 pages and added another issue, the urban crisis, to its program. This time, 13 sentences were devoted to worker safety and health on page 30. The AFL-CIO called for "federal
leadership and support" to get prompt act ion from politicians "toward achieving a safe, healthy
work environment for every American worker" (American Federation of Labor- Congress of in dustrial Organizations, 1968), yet this proposal was submitted a/ler the first version of the
OSHAct had been introduced in Congress.
Suggestions that the extent of the condition, public opinion or media interest, the environmental
movement's convergence with labor interests, or the push of organized labor motivated introduction of legislation clearly run contrary to fact. There is, however, much evidence to suggest that
rank-and-file act ivism was an important factor leading to the OSHAct. Moreover, a particular set
of political circumstances made it possible for the rank-and-file workers to exert more power than
was usually available to them.
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RANK·AND·FILE ACTIVISM

Throughout the 1960s, rank -and-file workers in many of the major labor union s expressed
their dissatisfaction with working conditions in general and with safety and health conditions in
particular. They also protested against the way their union officials were dealing with the problem . This dissatisfaction was seldom reported in the headlines of newspapers and magazines but
was a recurrent sub-theme in many articles appearing in publications such as the New York
Times, the Wall Street Journal, and Business Week. I surveyed articles indexed in the New York
Times Index and the Readers' Guide dealing with labor unrest and worker dissatisfaction from
1960 to 1967.' These sources are used to describe the actions of rank-and-file workers in several
major unions. Beginning in the mid-1960s, wage issues became less important as a source of
worker unrest. Grievance procedure, union local autonomy, working conditions, speed-ups, and
safety and health conditions were cited with increasing regularity as so urces of conflict between
the rank and file and their union officials and management.
The members of the United Auto Workers (UA W) were among the first groups to express their
dissatisfaction with working conditions. Between 1953 and 1955, thousands of UAW members
across the United States and in all major auto companies participated in wildcat strikes to protest
industry-imposed and union-sanctioned production speed-ups (Aronowitz, 1973). This rank-andfile concern continued throughout the 1950s and 1960s. In July, 1966,9,000 workers walked off
their jobs at three Ford plants in Cleveland where 200 unsettled grievances - most of them involving inadequate safety and health standards - had accumulated (Business Week, I 966a). In October, 1966, 4,200 UA W workers at the Twinsburg, Ohio, Chrysler plant went on strike over
unsettled grievances involving working conditions, including the dangers involved with fork-lift
trucks at the plant (Business Week, 1966b). The elimination of fumes at a Ford foundry plant in
Cleveland was a major demand by local leaders when the 1967 UA W contract was negotiated
(Shafer, 1967). Health and safety conditions caused frequent conflicts between management and
workers in the Ford plant in Livonia, Michigan. In 1967, the president of Local 182 in Livonia
complained that expenditures for health and safety conditions were usually the first to be cut
since they were not directly related to manufacturing the product (Business Week, 1967).
In February, 1967, a UAW local at a General Motors plant in Mansfield, Ohio, called a wildcat
st rike when two workers were fired for refusing to prepare materials and equipment for shipment
to another plant. Certain work operations were being shifted to the Pontiac, Michigan, plant as a
result of the Mansfield workers' complaints that safety conditions on that operation were poor.
In all, 133,000 workers from 20 different shops walked off the job. Walter Reuther, the president
of the UA W, called the strike illegal and sent representatives to Mansfield to convince local
leaders to call it off. Reuther's officials told the local leaders that their strike was ill-timed because
the national UA W organization was planning to give priority to higher salaries and profit-sharing
in upcoming contract negotiations (Weir, 1967). This fact strongly undermines claims that the
unions gave more attention to safety and health during the relatively prosperous sixties.
The United Mine Workers (UMW), usually one of the more militant unions, was also involved
in a major dispute over safety conditions. In the summer of 1965, five UMW members in Moundsville, West Virginia, were fired for refusing to work under conditions that they considered unsafe.
Employers had ordered the crew to work when the full mine operations were shut down. Within
days, more than 17,000 miners in West Virginia, Ohio, and Pennsylvania went on a wildcat strike
(U .S . Department of Labor, 1966). The members realized that their concern for worker safety
and health issues could only be implemented if they had greater participation in contract negotia-

2. Once a date for a particular incident o r issue dealing with sa fety and health conditions was found, I used
other sources to supplement the sources found in these two indexes.
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tions. They agreed to return to work only after the UMW International promised them a greater
voice in the next contract negotiations (Weir, 1967).
In June, 1965, 12,000 Teamsters in the Philadelphia area walked off their jobs when four
employees of one company were fired for refusing to work under conditions they considered
dangerous. The workers claimed that obstructions in their path made unloading their truck a
dangerous assignment. Jimmy Hoffa, then president of the Teamsters, called the strike illegal
and told the workers to go back to their jobs. They refused. The employers obtained a court injunction ordering the truckers back to work, but the strikers ignored it. The lead paragraph in a
New York Times story about the strike is remini scen t of scenes much more common in earlier
periods of union -management relations:
Armed with bats and iron pipes, gangs of striki ng truck drivers roamed the streets of Philadelphia today
attempting to halt the movement of food and freight (Bigart, 1965a: 16).
Mayor James Tate ordered the Philadelphia police to "break the siege by Teamsters who have
paralyzed the distribution of fruit and vegetables in the city" (Bigart, 1965b:49). A judge in the
Common Pleas Court suggested that the National Guard be called in if the police could not maintain law and order in a situation which he characterized as "a bit of anarchy" (Bigart, 1965c:36).
Fines of $35,000 a day against the local and $1,500 a day against each union official finally convinced the workers to go back to their jobs after a week (New York Times, 1965b). Before the
strike ended, officials of the city's four largest food chains announced that they were within a day
of being forced to close all their stores because of food shortages. Many gas station s closed
because deliveries were not made. One company laid off 1,200 of its 1,400 employees while
another furloughed all of its 1,250 workers (New York Times, 1965a).
While the issue of safety and health did not cause as seve re disruptions in the United
Steelworkers of America union , it was a constant underlying factor in the complaints of many
rank-and-file workers and local officials throughout the 1960s. The key issue in the Steelworkers'
1964 contract negotiations was not wages but working conditions. Weeks before the negotiating
sessions began, Local lOll in Youngstown, Ohio, placed a resolution before the union's district
council demanding a stronger emphasis on plant safety. It also urged that locals be given the right
to strike over local issues such as safety and health (Business Week, 1964). Members of a local
near Pittsburgh complained that safety and health precautions were frequently neglected by
management and appealed to the national leadership to give greater attention to the issue (Stetson, 1964).
Other unions also experienced rank-and-file discontent with officials' lack of concern over
working conditions. During the I 96Os, members of the International Longshoremen's Association, the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, the International Association of Machinists Union, and the International Union of Electrical Workers sought to bring
about better working conditions by striking and rejecting contracts negotiated by their officials.
Some, but not all, of these actions centered on safety and health conditions.
Clearly, safety and health concerns were on the minds of workers. More clearly, many rankand-file workers were protesting against unsafe and unhealthy workplace conditions. At the same
time, the political climate of the 1960s increased the likelihood that such protests would not fall
on deaf ears.
POLITICAL CLIMATE

In the summer of 1%7, Labor Department lawyers began drafting an occupational safety and
health bill . The bill was completed by late fall and included in a package of legislation sent to the
White House by the Labor Department at the end of 1967. White House officials then met with
Labor Depar't ment officials and representatives of several other agencies and departments to
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prepare the final version (Page and O'Brien, 1973). The bill was introduced in Congress in early
1968, an election year, at a time when the Johnson administration was coming under widespread
criticism for its handling of the Vietnam War. From late 1966 on, both the Harris and Gallup
polls indicated that the leading Republican slate, whether led by George Romney, Nelson Rockefeller, Ronald Reagan, or Richard Nixon, would defeat a Johnson-led ticket.
Organized labor's response to Johnson's candidacy was predictable. In January, 1967, George
Meany, president of the AFL-CIO, personally endorsed Johnson for president. The UA W's
Reuther, while voicing some concern over Johnson's handling of the war, followed suit eight
months later. An AFL-CIO poll of union members taken in January, 1967, showed Johnson
with a strong lead over any Republican challenger. Yet, as 1967 wore on, the support of the rank
and file became both more crucial and more problematic. Governor George Wallace's potential
candidacy further complicated the picture. Shannon (1967), a New York Times political analyst,
wrote in the summer of 1967 that Wallace's entry would severely undermine Johnson's prospects
for re-election. He pointed out that Johnson would need the strong united support of the traditional democratic allies, the trade unions, and liberal independents, but predicted that such support would not be forthcoming. It was clear that the Democratic party would not be unified and
that most liberals and much of the academic community would find it difficult to support
Johnson. This meant that labor's support was even more crucial for Johnson.
Concern over the loss of rank-and- file support was expressed most clearly in August, 1967, by
John Bailey, then head of the Democratic National Committee. He noted that the party was in
danger of losing its traditional support from the rank and file and suggested that prosperity "has
virtually elimi nated for the present and perhaps forever, many of the ties of traditional political
leadership." Workers were no longer going along with the candidates endorsed by union officials
(New York Times, 1967:30).
On January 23, 1968, Johnson announced to Congress that the protection of 75 million U.S.
workers must become a national goa\. The following day, the Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1968 was introduced in Congress. The swiftness with which the bill was drafted and introduced surprised Secretary Willard Wirtz, who testified that the bill "developed quickly," too
quickly to allow adequate consultation with those responsible for safety and health program~ at
the state level (U.S. Congress: House, 1968:34). Wirtz later admitted that he did not even know
Johnson "had decided to make occupational safety and health a principal element in his program
this year" until several days before the president's address to Congress (Page and O'Brien,
1973:140). The legislation was drafted and introduced at a time when the political support of
rank-and-file workers was desperately needed by the incumbent president. During Congressional
hearings on the bill in 1968, the Southern States Industrial Council issued a statement calling it
"an attempt to create in the public mind a crisis where none exists, in order to capitalize politically
on the natural concern of all citizens" for worker safety and health. It referred to the administration's "obvious election year effort by [sic) develop an image as guardian and saviour of the production worker" (U.S. Congress: House, 1968:960). In the Senate, the bill was never reported out
of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare in 1968, whi le the House Committee on Education and Labor did adopt an amended version. However, the bill never reached the House floor.
The priority usually given to administration bills disappeared when Johnson decided not to seek
his party's nomination (Page and O'Brien, 1973).
The key issue of the 1968 presidential election campaign was the Vietnam War. Campaigning
for "peace with honor," Nixon won despite Hubert Humphrey's 14 percent edge among union
workers (Harris, 1973). Nixon had sought the support of the "silent majority," the "forgotten
Americans, the non -shouters, the non-demonstrators," and continued to turn to them for support after the election. The "New American Majority" that Nixon sought to create had for its
backbone the working and middle class. The majority was "middle America" with its emphasis on
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tradit ional valu es. Geographically, it was the South and the et hnic a nd working-class p rec in cts of
the North and Midwest t ha t Nixon sought to use as a support base (Buchanan, 1973) . The Nixo n
administration soon discovered that one segment of the rank and file actuall y supported his efforts to win the war. T his poi nt was driven home during May, 1970, fo llowing th e U.S. invas io n
of Cam bod ia. As anti-war demonstrations grew in size and frequency, co nstruction workers in
New York C ity took to the streets in support of the presiden t. One particu lar m a rch, organized
by the building trades union, erupted in violence when it was rumored that anti-war protestors
ha d burned a U.S . flag . The workers attacked the demonstrators, mostl y st udents, with fi sts,
pipes, and wrenches . Wit hin weeks, the leaders of the construction workers' march were received
by Nixon in the White House a nd thanked for their suppo rt (Harris, 1973).
At the sam e time, Nixon continued to court the Teamsters. In the 1968 e lection , Nixon received
almost $ 1 millio n in campaign contributions from Las Vegas supporters who had secured la rge
loans from the Teamsters through their impriso ned leader , Jimmy Hoffa . Soon afterward , "the
wheels began to gri nd in the Ju st ice Department a nd White Hou se for a Hoffa pardon" (Velie,
1977:41) . Two hundred a nd fifty thousand Teamsters signed a petition urging Ni xo n to free Hoffa and suggesting th at their political support was co nditio na l upon Hoffa's release . Hoffa was
pa rdoned in December, 1971 (Velie, 1977) . While befriending both the new leaders hip and th e
rank-and-file Teamsters, Nixon also respo nded to an iss ue troubling ma ny Teamsters. The
Teamsters' strik e in Philadelphia was one indicati o n of thi s concern . To igno re the safety a nd
health issue would not be politically expedient, particularly afte r the Democrats reintroduced
their bill in 1969. So the Republicans countered severa l months la ter with their own, substa ntia ll y
weaker, bill . As long as th e Republican administratio n played a n active ro le a nd succeeded in
passing a worker safety and health bill, it co uld and did a rgue tha t it was p ro tect ing the safety a nd
health of the rank a nd file . The symbolic impact of the legisla tio n would ass ure th e Republ icans a
cla im to the rank-and-file vote in the 1972 election.)
The OSHAct of 1970 was a co mpromi se . W hile labor did not get a ll it wanted, the law does
give the rank and file a mechanism to improve the safety a nd health conditi o ns in wo rkplaces. J
Nor d id business get what it originally wanted-no law at a ll . However, it did succeed in
drastically diluting the original proposed legisla tion.
Struggles over the legal process do not end with the passage of legislatio n . Sin ce 1970, th e Occupational Safe ty and Health Administration has been attacked from many front s: by management for being overly concerned with trivial standa rds; by labor for being too weak, le ni ent, a nd
ineffective; a nd b y other branches of govern ment for propos ing sta nd ards th a t would fu el infl ation . The OSHAct awakened union interest in the issue. More managemen t-u ni o n safety committees have been fo rmed a nd m o re collecti ve bargaining agreements include sa fety a nd health provisions than ever before. In 1963-64, only five percent of 450 major agreements contained provisions for m a nagement-union coo peration . [n 1974- 75,44 perce nt of 1,724 ag reements co nt a ined
such provisions (U .S . Department of Labor, 1976). [n 1954-55, 22 percent of the agreemen ts

3. In the 1972 election, the AFL-C IO's Mea ny fought George McGove rn 's nominat ion and threa ten ed to put
on probation any loca l a ffiliate that endorsed him. Meany showed hi s personal prefere nce for Nixo n (Harr is,
1973). In th e cou rse of the 1972 ca mpa ign, Nixon was known to have received $ 165.000 from labor . mos tl y
from the Seafarers and th e Teamsters. Hoffa suspected that the Tea msters contributed much mo re th an th ey
reported (Alexander , 1976). Fifty-six percent of uni on members voted for Nixon (Harri s. 1973).
4. The OSHAct created the Occupational Sa fety and Health Administration in th e Department of Labor .
The Labor Department is responsible for setting standards for industry and for enforc in g th ose stand ards
t~rough in spections and penalti es, where appropriate. The Occupa ti onal Safety and Health Review Co mmisSIon was establi shed as an independent, quasi-judicia l review board appointed by the preside nt. It rules on a ll
enforcement action s of the Occupational Safety and Health Admin ist ration. Workers have the righl to ca ll in
tnspectors when th ey fee l haza rdous co nditi ons exist. Individual states may rega in auth oril Yto opera le th eir
Own programs if they can demon strate that they will be at least as effect ive as th e fede ra l progra m.

65

22

DONNELLY

contained clauses providing for joint committees, compared with 27 percent in 1974- 75 (U .S.
Department of Labor, 1976). Union members who feel their officials have not done enough in
this area have filed suits against their unions (Drapkin, 1981), and numerous regional committees
on worker safety and health have been organi zed (Berman, 1981). In addition, the Supreme
Court of the United States provided a basis for workers to refu se unsafe and unhealthy work in
the Whirlpool v. Marshall (1980) decision .
Businessmen have attempted to weaken the Occupational Safety and Health Administration by
challenging its standards, causing delays in their enactment, and using the courts and Congress to
limit its powers (Deutsch, 1981). Business has won its share of these battles, including the right of
plant managers to refuse entrance to inspectors who do not have court-issued warrants (Marshall
v. Barlow, 1978), and the requirement that the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
must demonstrate scientifically that reductions in exposure limits be "reasonably necessary" to
provide safe and healthy employment conditions (Industrial Union Department, AFL- CIO v.
American Petroleum Institute, 1980).
SUMMARY

Previous explanations of the OSHAct are based on public statements made during Congressional hearings in which union officials and environmental groups painted a dismal picture of
rapidly deteriorating safety and health conditions. However, the OSHAct was not spawned by a
growing safety problem, by heightened public awareness of the problem, by a convergence of the
environmental movement with worker health and safety interests, or by the concerted efforts of
organized labor. Rather, the roots of the law can be traced to the rebellion of rank-and-file
workers across the United States at a time when the political support of these workers was particularly important. Wildcat strikes, walkouts, rejected contracts, and violent confrontations expressed rank-and-file dissatisfaction with existing safety and health conditions. The low ratings
of an incumbent president in a pre-election year made united rank-and-file support an essential
ingredient for political success. These two factors together made possible the emergence of a
worker safety and health law.
DISCUSSION

Since the origins of this law lie in the overt class struggle initiated by the rank and file, we must
look more closely at the nature of that conflict. The conflict was directed at those employers who
operated unsafe and unhealthy workplaces. The rank and file sought to change workplace conditions which, in the United States, are usually considered the sole domain of employers. In refusing to do hazardous work, in walking off unsafe work sites, and in stopping the flow of business
traffic, the workers disrupted employers' operations. In some cases, entire businesses were forced
to shut down. The rank and file employed its most potent weapon, its labor, in an attempt to
force concessions relating to safety and health conditions .
However, the protests were not directed solely at those businesses who maintained unsafe and
unhealthy workplaces . They were also directed at the union hierarchy, who consistently expressed
little or no concern oyer hazardous working conditions. These protests indicated that the rank
and file wanted their union officials to take a more active role in determining safety and health
conditions. Rejected contracts and refusals to obey union officials' back-to-work orders cast
doubt on the legitimacy of the union hierarchy. In unions with more democratic electoral
systems, these protests threatened re-election for officials, whose problems were compounded
when management realized that the officials could no longer guarantee acceptance of negotiated
contracts. More generally, these protests showed that the union officials had lost touch with their
constituency and that they no longer represented the workers' interests.
The rank-and-file struggles of the 1950s and 1960s that culminated in the OSHAct were an at-
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tempt by workers to protect their own health and safety . Deutsch (1981) suggests that such struggles cannot be separated from the broader issues of worker control and democracy in the workplace. In this case, the workers sought to force both employers to improve conditions and their
union officials to assert more power in shap ing these conditions . When the officials did not, the
rank and file rejected negotiated contracts. Simultaneously, the rank and file sought to exert
more influence in union decision-making by demanding more input into contract negotiations. In
general, workers were demanding a greater voice in the operations of the workplace.
On a broader level, the law channeis future conflict into bureaucratic procedures. Byawakening union interest in safety and health, the OSHAct gives more union workers institutionalized
conflict-resolution mechanisms in their collective bargaining agreements. They can work to
eliminate hazards through their plant safety and health comm ittees or through the established
grievance procedures in their contracts. These mechanisms defuse overt conflict. In addit ion, the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration and the Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission also act as institutionalized mechanisms to deal with issues relating to safety and
health on the job. The rank and file may work through these agencies to resolve disputes over
hazards. Instead of walking off the job when other attempts to eliminate workplace hazards fai l,
workers now have the right, which they are expected to exercise, to call in Occupational Safety
and Health inspectors. Instead of open confrontations, legal mechanisms are available to improve working conditions. The nature of the conflict is changed. Problems of unsa fe and
unhealthy workplaces have become bureaucratic, legal issues rather than political ones. The conflict takes place in judicial or quasi-judicial settings rather than in the workplaces and the streets.

REFERENCES
Alexander, Herbert E.
1976
Financing the 1972 Election . Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books.
Altman, Stephen
1976
"Growing pains: A portrait of developing occupational safety and health in America." Job Safety and Health 4 (August):24-32.
American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations
1964
AFL-CIO Platform Proposals, 1964 . Washington, D.C.: AFL-CIO.
1968
AFL-CIO Platform Proposa ls, 1968. Washington, D.C.: AFL-CIO.
Aronowitz, Stanley
1973
False Promises. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Ashford, Nicholas
1976
Crisis in the Workplace: Occupational Disease and Injury. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT.
Becker, Howard
1963
Outsiders. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe.
Berman, Daniel
1978
Death on the job. New York: Month ly Review Press.
1981
"Grassroots coalitions in health and safety: The COSH groups." Labor Studies Journal 6
(Spring): 104- 113.
Bigart, Homer
1965a
"Teamsters strike in Philadelphia." New York Times, June 22: 16.
1965b
"Strikers curbed in Philadelphia." New York Times, June 23:49.
1965c
"Hoffa aid asked by Phi ladelphi a." New York Times, June 24:36.
Blumer, Herbert
1971
"Social problems as collective behavior." Social Problems 18 :298-306 .
Buchanan, Patrick
1973
The New Majority. The Girard Company.
Bureau of National Affairs
1971
The Job Safety and Health Act of 1970. Washington, D.C.: Bureau of National Affairs.
Business Week
1964
"Steel locals turn restive ." November 7:90.
1966a
"Walkout at three Ford plants involves grievances over health and safety standards. " July 16:58.
"Chrysler gets back into production after strike closes most assembly lines." October 8: 148.
I966b
1967
"Where the auto talks arc going smoot hly ." September 23: 146.

67

24

DONNELLY

Cummins, E. E.
1932
The Labor Problem in the United States. New York : Van Nostrand.
Deutsch, Steven
1981
"Extending workplace democracy: Struggles to come in job safety and health." Labor Studies
Journal 6 (Spring): 124-132.
Dickson, Donald
1968
"Bureaucracy and morality: An organizational perspective op a moral crusade." Social Problems 16:143- 156.
Drapkin, Larry
1981
"Bargaining for health and safety: Opening a Pandora's box of liability." Labor Studies Journal
6 (Spring):82-94 .
Funkhouser, G. Ray
1973
"Trends in media coverage of the issues of the '60s." Journalism Quarterly 50
(Autumn):533-538.
Gall iher, John F., and Allyn Walker
1977
"The puzzle of the social origins of the marijuana tax ac t of 1937 ." Social Problems 24:367-376.
Gallup, George
1972
The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1935-1971. New York: Random House.
Gersuny, Carl
1981
Work Hazards and Industrial Conflict. Hanover, New Hampshire: University Press of New England, for University of Rhode Island .
Gunningham, Neil
1974
Pollution, Social Interest, and the Law. Bath, England: The Pitman Press.
Harris, Louis
1973
The Anguish of Change. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc .
National Safety Council
1981
Accident Facts . Washington, D.C.: National Safety Council.
New York Times
1965a
"Strike pinch felt in Philadelphia." June 25:34.
1965b
"Teamsters end wildcat strike." June 27:54.
1967
"Prosperity role feared by Bailey." August 27:30.
Page, Joseph A., and Mary-Win O'Brien
1973
Bitter Wages. New York: Grossman Brothers.
Piven, Frances Fox, and Richard Cloward
1971
Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare. New York: Pantheon Books.
Public Papers of the Presidents
1966-71 Mi lwood, New York: Kraus-Thompson Organization Press.
Ross, Robert, and Graham Staines
1972
"The politics of analyzing social problems." Social Problems 20:18-39.
Schoenfeld, A. Clay; Robert Meier; and Robert Griffin
1979
"Constructing a social problem: The press and the environment." Social Problems 27:38-61.
Shafer, Ronald
1967
"UAW's local issues ." Wall Street Journal , August 25:1.
Shannon, William V.
1967
"President Johnson and the peace democrats." New York Times, July 25:34.
Stellman, Jeanne, and Susan Daum
1973
Work is Dangerous to Your Health. New York: Vintage Books.
Stetson, Damon
1964
"Raise is a secondary issue in steel." New York Times, December 6:73.
U.S. Congress: House of Representatives
1968
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1968. Committee on Education and Labor, Select Subcommittee on Labor . 90th Congress, 2nd Session. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.
U.S . Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
1972
President's Report on Occupational Safety an d Health. Washington, D.C. U.S. Government
Printing Office.
U.S. Department of Labor
1956
Collective Bargaining Clauses: Labor-Management, Safety, Production, and Industry Stabilization Committees. Bureau of Labor Statistics Bulletin 1201. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.
1961 - 70 Analysis of Work Stoppages. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office.
1966
Major Collective Bargain ing Agreements: Management Rights a nd Union-Management Cooperation. Bureau of Labor Statistics Bulletin 1425-5 . Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office .

68

Occupational Sa fety and Hea lth Act
1976

25

Major Collective Bargaining Agreements: Safety and Health Provisions. Bureau of Labor Statistics Bulletin 1425-16 . Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.

Velie, Lester
1977
Desperate Bargain. New York: Reader's Digest Press .
Weir, Stan
1967
U.S.A. : The Labor Revolt of the 196Os. Somerville, Mass.: New England Free Press.
Woodbury, Robert
1927
Workers' Health and Safety: A Statistical Program. New York: Macmi llan.

Cases cited
Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 48 U.S .L.W. 5022, 1980.
Marshall v. Barlow, 46 U .S .L.W. 4483, 1978.
Whirlpool Corporation v. Marshall, 48 U.S.L.W . 4189, 1980.

69

